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Abstract—A moving top-k spatial keyword (MkSK) query, which takes into account a continuously moving query location, enables a
mobile client to be continuously aware of the top-k spatial web objects that best match a query with respect to location and text
relevance. The increasing mobile use of the web and the proliferation of geo-positioning render it of interest to consider a scenario
where spatial keyword search is outsourced to a separate service provider capable at handling the voluminous spatial web objects
available from various sources. A key challenge is that the service provider may return inaccurate or incorrect query results
(intentionally or not), e.g., due to cost considerations or invasion of hackers. Therefore, it is attractive to be able to authenticate the
query results at the client side. Existing authentication techniques are either inefficient or inapplicable for the kind of query we consider.
We propose new authentication data structures, the MIR-tree and MIR-tree, that enable the authentication of MkSK queries at low
computation and communication costs. We design a verification object for authenticating MkSK queries, and we provide algorithms for
constructing verification objects and using these for verifying query results. A thorough experimental study on real data shows that the
proposed techniques are capable of outperforming two baseline algorithms by orders of magnitude.
Index Terms—Spatial databases, query processing, authentication, spatial keyword search
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
Aspatial keyword query [6], [8], [12], [37], [38] integrateslocation and text search. Taking a location and a set of
keywords as arguments, such queries return relevant spatial
web objects that match the arguments. Spatial web objects
can be points of interest (e.g., restaurants, tourist attractions,
hotels, entertainment services) with a web presence, and
they thus have locations as well as textual descriptions. A
moving top-k spatial keyword (MkSK) query [39], [40],
which takes into account a continuously moving query loca-
tion, enables a mobile client to be continuously aware of the
top-k spatial web objects that best match a query with
respect to location and text relevance, and it has numerous
mobile uses. For example, a mobile client may activate a
“cafe” query in order to be alerted about nearby opportuni-
ties for a cup of coffee. With the MkSK query, a client
always has an up-to-date result as the client moves. The cli-
ent can ignore a result and just keep moving until an
appealing result appears.
A straightforward solution to the MkSK query is to peri-
odically invoke an existing snapshot spatial keyword query
processing technique. However, this approach has the prob-
lem that even if snapshot queries are processed very fre-
quently, which is expensive and wasteful because
consecutive results are likely to be very similar, there is no
guarantee that the user always has the right, up-to-date
result. Another possible solution is to extend a buffering
technique for spatial kNN query processing [35] to top-k
spatial keyword querying. Given a kNN query, this tech-
nique retrieves kþ Dk nearest neighbors and uses them to
derive a buffer region with the property that as long as the
user moves inside the region, the kNN result can be derived
from the kþ Dk objects. However, it is not known how to
extend this technique to MkSK queries, where both text rele-
vance and spatial distance are considered. A safe zone
based approach [39], [40] for the processing of MkSK
queries returns a safe zone to a client together with the
query result. The safe zone is a region containing the
user’s location and in which the top-k result remains
unchanged. The safe zone based approach significantly
reduces the communication between clients and the ser-
vice provider (SP) as well as computation costs, since
the client needs to request new result only when leaving
the safe zone.
Example 1.1. Consider the example MkSK query q in
Fig. 1, where the query keywords are “vanilla coffee.”
The text relevance of objects p1 and p2 to q are 2 and 1,
respectively, when using the number of matched key-
words for defining relevance. The service provider
returns object p2 as the top-1 result and the gray circle
as the safe zone of p2, meaning that as long as the client
remains inside the gray circle, object p2 is the top-1
result. The curved path shows the client’s movement.
When the client crosses the boundary of the gray circle
(at q0), it sends its updated location to the service pro-
vider that then computes and returns a new top-1 result
p1 and the white region as the safe zone.
The web is increasingly being used by mobile users,
some 20-50 percent of web queries have local intent
[14], [34], and web content with location continues to prolif-
erate (e.g., web pages, business director entries, tweets,
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check-ins). This development renders it relevant to enable
the outsourcing of spatial keyword querying. Such out-
sourcing of query functionality by an entity that wishes to
deliver a service, called a data owner (DO), to a service pro-
vider offers a number of advantages [15], including elastic
scaling, cost savings, and high availability when compared
to conventional client-server architectures. Moreover, data
owners need not buy high performance hardware and hire
technical staff to maintain the service. The outsourcing is
likely to also improve service availability. In addition, out-
sourcing can reduce the network latency associated with
the delivery of query results.
However, being outside of the administrative scope of
the DO, the SP may return inaccurate or incorrect query
results, intentionally or unintentionally, e.g., due to cost
considerations or invasion of hackers [36]. In our setting,
the SP may return an overly large safe zone together with
a query result in order to save computing resources and
communication bandwidth [27], [43]. The SP may also
return an overly small safe zone to incur frequent
requests from the client if the SP is paid per request.
Therefore, query authentication, i.e., establishing the
soundness and completeness of query results at the client
side, is highly desirable. Soundness guarantees that every
result object is present in the DO’s database and is not
tampered with. Completeness ensures that no valid result
object is missed in a query result.
Authentication techniques have been developed for a
variety of queries, including relational queries [19], [26],
[41], sliding window queries [20], [29], spatial queries [16],
[42], text similarity queries [27], shortest path queries [43],
moving kNN queries [44], moving range queries [45], and
subgraph search [11], [30]. However, all existing Authenti-
cated Data Structures (ADS) are either inapplicable or ineffi-
cient in relation to our setting, since the authentication of
MkSK queries involves verifying both spatial proximity and
text relevance. Moreover, authenticating an MkSK query
includes verifying both the top-k result and the accompa-
nying safe zone. The safe zone is calculated based on both
the objects in the top-k result and the objects not in the top-k
result, so that missing a non-result object may cause a safe
zone to fail in the authentication. Although authentication
techniques for moving kNN queries [44] and moving range
queries [45] involve safe zone verification, the safe zone of
an MkSK query is very different, i.e., it is a Multiplicatively
Weighted (MW) Voronoi cell [25].
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
study the authentication of moving top-k spatial keyword
queries. Our proposals also apply to the authentication of
static top-k spatial keyword queries (only verifying the top-
k result), which is a sub-task of the authentication of MkSK
queries. Our contributions include
 We design a new data structure for the authentica-
tion of MkSK queries, the MIR-tree, that enables low
computation and communication costs. The MIR-
tree is applicable to many variant of the spatial key-
word query.
 We design a Verification Object (VO) for authenticat-
ing the top-k results and safe zones of MkSK queries.
Algorithms for constructing VO and verifying the
top-k results and safe zones using VO are developed.
 An enhanced data structure, the MIR-tree, is pro-
posed to further reduce the communication cost. The
idea of the MIR-tree is applicable for any tree-struc-
tured ADS, e.g., the MR-tree [42], where each node
contains multiple entries.
 We conduct a thorough experimental study on real
data to evaluate the performance of our proposals.
The proposed approaches are able to outperform
two baseline algorithms exploiting existing authenti-
cation techniques by orders of magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The prob-
lem setting is presented in Section 2. The two new ADSs,
the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree, the design of a VO, and
accompanying algorithms for the authentication of MkSK
queries are introduced in Section 3. We describe the two
baseline algorithms and study the performance of our pro-
posals in Section 4. Related work is covered in Section 5,
and we conclude in Section 6.
2 PROBLEM SETTING
2.1 Moving Top-k Spatial Keyword Query
We consider a generic problem setting in which the future
locations of an MkSK query cannot be predicted in advance
[39], [40]. Let D be a data set in which each object p 2 D is a
pair h;ci of a point location p: and a text description, or
document, p:c (e.g., the facilities and menu of a restaurant).
A moving top-k spatial keyword (MkSK) query q ¼ h;c; ki
takes three arguments: a continuously changing point loca-
tion , a set of keywords c, and a number of requested
objects k. Intuitively, an object whose description is more
relevant to the query keywords and is closer to the query
location is preferable. We use a weighted distance (Equa-
tion (1)) [3] as our ranking function. This type of function
has been used extensively in the geo-sciences [13], [18] and
it matches the semantics of the query. A key strength of this
function is that the different units of measurement of the
spatial distance and textual relevance is canceled out in the
ratio and thus do not affect the result.
rankqðpÞ ¼ kq pk
trqðpÞ ; (1)
where kq pk denotes their Euclidean distance and trqðpÞ
denote the text relevancy of p to q. The MkSK query
retrieves k objects RS that minimize the ranking value and
a safe zone kðRSÞ within which the top-k result is valid.
Formally, 8p 2 RS ð8p0 2 D RS ðrankqðpÞ  rankqðp0ÞÞÞ
and q: 2 kðRSÞ ) RS is the top-k result.
Fig. 1. Example MkSK query.
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The safe zone of the top-k result of an MkSK query is an
order-k MW-Voronoi cell [25] that is an irregular geometric
entity. The text relevancy of an object to the query is the
weight used in the computation of MW-Voronoi cells. We
thus use weight wðÞ and text relevancy trqðÞ interchange-
ably. Note that the safe zone preserves the set of top-k
objects, not the ranking of the top-k objects. More details
about safe zones is provided in Appendix A, which is avail-
able in the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.
ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TKDE.2014.2350252.
Table 6 in Appendix A, available online, summarises the
symbols used in the paper.
2.2 Authentication Framework
Fig. 2 illustrates the framework for answering MkSK queries
that supports correctness verification. The framework con-
sists of two phases, i.e., initialization and query processing
& authentication. In the initialization phase, the DO first
gets a private key from a key distribution center. Next, it
signs the ADS constructed on the data set using the private
key and transfers the ADS and signatures to the SP. A client
downloads a public key from the key distribution center
and the signatures from the SP. In the query processing and
authentication phase, the client first issues an MkSK query.
Upon receiving the query, the SP computes the top-k result,
the safe zone, and a verification object that encodes the
query result and its safe zone. The client gets the VO from
the SP. The top-k result RS and its safe zone kðRSÞ are
obtained from the VO. The correctness of the top-k result
and the safe zone can be verified by the client using the VO,
the signatures, and the public key. The client needs to send
a new request to the SP only when it leaves the safe zone.
2.3 Authentication Tasks
The authentication of an MkSK query q amounts to guaran-
teeing that the client always has the correct top-k result
while its spatial location changes continuously. The safe
zone based approach guarantees that as long as the query
does not exit the safe zone, the received top-k result remains
valid. In other words, when the query moves across the
boundary of a safe zone, it requests an updated top-k result
and corresponding safe zone. Therefore, authenticating an
MkSK query is equivalent to verifying the correctness of
both the top-k result RS and the corresponding safe zone.
The sufficient condition of MkSK query authentication can
be further divided into four sub-conditions
(I) Soundness of a top-k result.
8p 2 RS ðp 2 DÞ: (2)
Every object in the top-k result must present in DO’s data
set. Specifically, both the location and the text description of
the object are not tampered with and the ranking score
rankqðpÞ of p is computed correctly.
(II) Completeness of a top-k result.
8p 2 RS ð8p0 2 D RS ðrankqðpÞ  rankqðp0ÞÞÞ: (3)
All objects not in the top-k result have ranking scores that
are no better than any of those of the result objects.
(III) Soundness of a safe zone.
8p 2 I ðp 2 DÞ: (4)
Since a safe zone is computed from the result objects and the
influence objects [40], the facts that the locations and the text
descriptions of the influence objects are not tampered with,
the text relevancies of influence objects are computed cor-
rectly, and sub-condition (I) guarantee the soundness of a
safe zone.
(IV) Completeness of safe zone.
80 2 kðRSÞ ðQð0;c; kÞ
¼ Qð;c; kÞ
^
80 =2 kðRSÞ ðQð0;c; kÞ 6¼ Qð;c; kÞ:
(5)
For all locations 0 in the safe zone, the result of the query
with parameters 0, the keywords of the original query c,
and k on the original data set is the same as the result of the
original query Qð;c; kÞ. For all 0 not in the safe zone, the
two results are different.
2.4 Threat Model
The SP is the potential adversary [42]. The SP is outside the
administrative scope of the DO and thus cannot be trusted.
With the exception of the DO’s private key, adversaries are
assumed to know all information, including the public key
for the secure-hash function, the ADS, the signatures, and
the authentication algorithms. They may alter the data set
or the ADS, and they may tamper with the search result.
Issues related to privacy are beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5 Problem Statement
We study the authentication of MkSK queries, aiming for a
solution that (i) verifies the soundness and completeness of
the top-k result and the safe zone of a given MkSK query
and (ii) optimizes the server-side computational cost and
the client/server communication cost, i.e., the VO size.
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
Most existing authentication techniques construct a region
(range), also called a verification set, that covers the query
result. The data objects that fall into the verification set are
sent to the client. In addition, summary objects that are used
to derive bounds on the ranking scores of the objects outside
Fig. 2. MkSK query authentication.
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the verification set are sent to the client. In other words, the
VO contains the objects inside the verification set and a
number of summary objects. Using this VO, the client is
able to authenticate the result. Since the result of an MkSK
query is retrieved according to Equation (1), authenticating
an MkSK query involves verifying both the spatial distan-
ces and text relevancies of the result objects. The current
state-of-the-art solution for authenticating spatial queries,
the MR-tree [42], and the existing method for authenticat-
ing the query results of text search engines [27] can be
used to authenticate the spatial and textual parts of the
result objects separately. However, this approach is ineffi-
cient because it generates a large VO based on a large veri-
fication set, which causes high communication cost and
long authentication time, as we will show in the paper’s
experimental study. We propose a new ADS, the MIR-tree
(Section 3.1), for efficiently verifying MkSK queries. It is
also applicable to spatial keyword queries based on other
ranking functions. The proposed authentication algorithms
(in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) construct a compact VO, i.e., put
minimum numbers of objects and MIR-tree entries into the
VO. Hence, the communication cost and authentication
time are saved. To further reduce the size of a VO, we pro-
pose an enhanced ADS, the MIR-tree (in Section 3.4).
3.1 MIR-Tree
The Merkle-IR-tree (MIR-tree) is developed based on the IR-
tree [8], by embedding a series of digests in each node of the
tree. In the IR-tree, each entry summarizes the spatial distan-
ces and text relevancies of the entries in its child node. This
index enables the efficient processing of spatial keyword
queries, since it is able to prune the search space according to
spatial proximity and text relevance simultaneously. In the
MIR-tree, to authenticate text relevancies, a word digest is
stored with each entry in each posting list in the inverted file
attached to each non-leaf node. Formally, for a word w, a
posting list entry takes the form ðid; weight; hwðeÞÞ, where id
is the identifier of an entry e in a node in the tree, weight is
the weight of w in the pseudo text description of e, and hwðeÞ
is the word digest of e for word w. The word digest of e for w
is computed from the hash value of the concatenation ‘j’ of
the binary representation of all the entries in the posting list
ofw in the child node of e:
hwðeÞ ¼ hððce1; weight; hwðce1ÞÞ j ðce2; weight; hwðce2ÞÞ j   Þ;
(6)
where cei (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .) is an entry in the child node of e and
hðÞ is a secure hash function. Entries in leaf nodes do not
have word digests.
Fig. 3 and Table 1 illustrate how word digests are stored
and computed, respectively. For example, in InvF -R5 the
word digest of word ‘c’ (hcðR1Þ) for non-leaf entry R1 is
computed as hcðR1Þ ¼ hððp1; 5Þjðp2; 5ÞÞ; in InvF -root the
word digest of word ‘c’ (hcðR5Þ) for non-leaf entry R5 is
computed as hcðR5Þ ¼ hððR2; 7; hcðR2ÞÞjðR1; 5; hcðR1ÞÞÞ,
which takes the digests in the child nodes (hcðR1Þ and
hcðR2Þ) into account. The digests of other words are com-
puted similarly. Note that, word digests do not occupy any
space in nodes. They are stored in the inverted files attached
to nodes. The word digests of the root node (e.g., hcðrootÞ)
are signed by the data owner (e.g., RSAðhcðrootÞÞ) and are
stored with the MIR-tree. Each word has a root signature.
Furthermore, to authenticate spatial distances, a spatial
digest is stored with each non-leaf entry. Formally, a non-
leaf node contains entries of the form ðRi;Ri:L; Ri:hÞ, where
Ri is a reference to its child node, Ri:L is the MBR of all rec-
tangles in entries of the child node, and Ri:h is the spatial
digest of the child node. The leaf nodes are identical to those
of the IR-tree. The spatial digest of a leaf node is computed
from the hash value of the concatenation of the binary
representation of all objects in the node. The spatial digest
Fig. 3. Example MIR-Tree.
TABLE 1
Example Word Digest Computations
InvF-R5
haðR2Þ ¼ hððp3; 7ÞÞ
haðR1Þ ¼ hððp1; 5ÞÞ
hbðR1Þ ¼ hððp2; 5ÞÞ
hbðR2Þ ¼ hððp8; 3ÞÞ
hcðR2Þ ¼ hððp4; 7Þ j ðp8; 3ÞÞ
hcðR1Þ ¼ hððp1; 5Þ j ðp2; 5ÞÞ
hdðR2Þ ¼ hððp3; 1Þ j ðp4; 1ÞÞ
InvF-R6
haðR3Þ ¼ hððp5; 4Þ j ðp9; 3ÞÞ
haðR4Þ ¼ hððp7; 1ÞÞ
hbðR3Þ ¼ hððp5; 4Þ j ðp9; 3ÞÞ
hbðR4Þ ¼ hððp6; 4Þ j ðp7; 1ÞÞ
hcðR4Þ ¼ hððp7; 4Þ j ðp6; 3ÞÞ
hdðR4Þ ¼ hððp7; 1ÞÞ
InvF-root
haðR5Þ ¼ hðð7; haðR2ÞÞ j ð5; haðR1ÞÞÞ
haðR6Þ ¼ hðð4; haðR3ÞÞ j ð1; haðR4ÞÞÞ
hbðR5Þ ¼ hðð5; hbðR1ÞÞ j ð3; hbðR2ÞÞÞ
hbðR6Þ ¼ hðð4; hbðR3ÞÞ j ð4; hbðR4ÞÞÞ
hcðR5Þ ¼ hðð7; hcðR2ÞÞ j ð5; hcðR1ÞÞÞ
hcðR6Þ ¼ hðð4; hcðR4ÞÞÞ
hdðR5Þ ¼ hðð1; hdðR2ÞÞÞ
hdðR6Þ ¼ hðð1; hdðR4ÞÞÞ
haðrootÞ ¼ hðð7; haðR5ÞÞ j ð4; haðR6ÞÞÞ
hbðrootÞ ¼ hðð5; hbðR5ÞÞ j ð4; hbðR6ÞÞÞ
hcðrootÞ ¼ hðð7; hcðR5ÞÞ j ð4; hcðR6ÞÞÞ
hdðrootÞ ¼ hðð1; hdðR5ÞÞ j ð1; hdðR6ÞÞÞ
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of a non-leaf node summarizes its child nodes’ MBRs as
well as their digests. The root spatial digest is signed and
stored with the MIR-tree. Fig. 3 and Table 2 illustrate how
spatial digests are stored and computed, respectively.
The shaded parts in Fig. 3 show the additions to the MIR-
tree over the IR-tree. The update cost of the MIR-tree is com-
parable to that of the IR-tree. Specifically, when inserting or
deleting an object in a leaf node, the spatial and word digests
in its parent node are re-computed only if the MBR and the
word weights of the parent node are changed. If splitting
happens, the spatial and word digests of affected nodes are
re-computed. Changes are propagated to the root node.
3.2 Top-k Result Authentication
The challenge of verifying a top-k result involves the design
of a compact VO that achieves low communication cost and
short authentication time. The inefficiency of authenticating
spatial distances and text relevancies separately using exist-
ing techniques [27], [42] can be illustrated by the following
example. Imagine a data set of five objects p1; . . . ; p5 having
spatial distances 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and text relevancies 5, 6, 7, 8, 20,
with regard to a query. According to the ranking function in
Equation (1), objects p1 and p5 make up the top-2 result with
ranking scores 0.2 and 0.25. If authenticating the spatial dis-
tance and text relevance separately, one verification set cover-
ing the objects with spatial distances smaller than 5 (the
maximum spatial distance in the result) and the other verifi-
cation set covering the objects with text relevancies larger
than 5 (the minimum text relevance in the result) are con-
structed. Therefore, the whole data set is covered by the two
verification sets and added to the VO, which incurs very high
communication cost. Ideally, only one verification set cover-
ing the objects (p1 and p5) with ranking scores smaller than
0.25 (the maximum value of a ranking score of a result object)
should be constructed. Thus, only three objects p1, p5 and a
summary object representing all the other objects in the data
setmake up a VO that achieves low communication cost.
3.2.1 VO Construction
The proposed ADS, the MIR-tree, has the desirable property
that only a minimum number of objects andMIR-tree entries
need to be inserted into the VO. We construct a verification
set VSrs covering the objects with ranking scores smaller than
rankk ¼ maxp2RSfrankqðpÞg, i.e., the maximum score in the
top-k result. Recall that the smaller the score, the better the
ranking. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for constructing
the VO for the top-k result. Each entry e in the VO takes the
form ðid;L;H; fðw;weight; hwðÞÞgÞ, where id is an identifier,
L is an MBR, H is a spatial digest, and ðw;weight; hwðÞÞ is a
triple where w is the identifier of one query keyword, weight
is the weight of word w, and hwðÞ is the word digest. If id
refers to an object, itsH and hwðÞ values are empty.
Algorithm 1. VOConstruction (MIRtreeNode N , double
rankk, MkSKQuery q)
1: Append ½ to strrs;
2: for each entry e inN do
3: if N is a leaf node then
4: Add VOEntryðeÞ to VO;
5: Append e to strrs;
6: else "N is a non-leaf node.
7: if rankqðeÞ > rankk then
8: Append e to strrs;
9: Add VOEntryðeÞ to VO;
10: else
11: VOConstruction (e, rankk, q);
12: Append  to strrs;
13: Return VO and strrs;
The VO is computed by a depth-first traversal of the MIR-
tree using the following conditions: (i) if a non-leaf entry e
has a ranking score rankqðeÞ ¼ kq ekmin=trqðeÞ that is higher
than rankk, the VO entry for e is constructed and added to
the VO, and its subtree will not be visited (lines 7-9); other-
wise, Algorithm 1 is called to process the child node of e
(lines 25-26); (ii) for any visited leaf node, all the objects in it
are added to the VO (line 7). When constructing the VO, a
traversal string strrs is composed that tracks the search in
the MIR-tree. It contains the identifiers of the tree entries
and objects added to the VO, as well as the special tokens ‘½’
and ‘’ used to mark the scope of a node (line 11). The tra-
versal string is needed in order to avoid having duplicate
entries in the VO, since the VO for the top-k result and the
VO for the safe zone may otherwise have common entries,
as will be explained later. Finally, the VO and the traversal
string strrs are sent to the client.
Example 3.1. Fig. 3 shows the MIR-tree built on the spatial
web objects in Fig. 4. Let q be an MkSK query with query
keyword ‘c’, where k ¼ 1. Its top-1 result is object p1. The
traversal string strrs is ½½½p1p2½p3p4p8½R3R4. The VO is
fðp1; p1:L; fðc; 5ÞgÞ, ðp2; p2:L; fðc; 5ÞgÞ, ðp3; p3:L; fðc; 7ÞgÞ,
ðp4; p4:L; fgÞ, ðp8; p8:L; fðc; 3ÞgÞ; ðR3; R3: L; R3:H; fgÞ; ðR4;
R4:L; R4:H, fðc; 4; hcðR4ÞÞgÞg. The entries shown using
bold font in Fig. 3 are added to the VO. Since object p4
and entry R3 do not contain word ‘c’, their
ðw;weight; hwðÞÞ sets are empty. The root spatial signa-
ture RSA ðroot:HÞ and the root word signature
RSAðhcðrootÞÞ are sent to the client together with the VO
and the traversal string.
TABLE 2
Example Spatial Digest Computations
R1:h ¼ hðp1 j p2Þ
R2:h ¼ hðp3 j p4 j p8Þ
R3:h ¼ hðp5 j p9Þ
R4:h ¼ hðp6 j p7Þ
R5:h ¼ hðR1:L jR1:h jR2:L jR2:hÞ
R6:h ¼ hðR3:L jR3:h jR4:L jR4:hÞ
root:h ¼ hðR5:L jR5:h jR6:L jR6:hÞ
Fig. 4. Spatial web objects.
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3.2.2 Verifying a Top-k Result
The client extracts the top-k result from the VO and authen-
ticates it. It first computes the ranking scores of the objects
in the VO using Equation (1), ranks them, and obtains the
top-k objects. Next, the client re-computes the root spatial
and word digests using the strrs and VO (Algorithm 2) and
verifies them against the decrypted root spatial and word
signatures. The main idea is to re-construct the MIR-tree tra-
versal performed by the server, i.e., guaranteeing the entries
in the VO are from the original MIR-tree. Then, it verifies
the correctness of the top-k result by checking whether the
ranking score computed from Equation (1) of the kth object
is no worse than those of all the other entries in the VO.
Example 3.2. Consider the traversal string strrs and the VO
in Example 3.1. The root spatial digest is re-constructed
as hðMBRðp1:L; p2:L; p3:L; p4:L; p8:LÞ j hðMBRðp1:L;
p2:LÞ j hðp1 j p1:L j p2 j p2:LÞ jMBRðp3:L; p4:L; p8:LÞ jhðp3j
p3:L j p4 j p4:L j p8 j p8:LÞÞ j MBRðR3:L; R4:LÞ j hðR3:L j
R3:H jR4:L jR4:HÞÞ. The root word digest of ‘c’ is hðð7;
hðð7; hððp4; 7Þ j ðp8; 3ÞÞÞ j ð5; hððp1; 5Þ j ðp2; 5ÞÞÞÞÞ j ð4; hðð4;
dcðR4ÞÞÞÞÞ. The steps needed to compute the spatial and
word digests are shown in Fig. 5.
3.2.3 Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we prove that our proposal can authenticate
the top-k result.
Proof of soundness. Suppose that an object p in the result is
fake or modified. The re-constructed root spatial and word
digests (hash values) cannot be verified against the signa-
tures provided by the data owner, which is detected, since
the hash function is one way collision-resistant and p and its
word weights must be used by Algorithm 2.
Proof of completeness. Let p be one of the top-k objects
and let N be the leaf node containing p. If all the entries
in N are in the VO, for sure p is in the VO and is included
in the top-k result. If N is pruned by the server, the MBR,
keyword weights and digests of N are in the VO. The cli-
ent obtains the top-k result from the VO, which does not
include p. Since the re-constructed root spatial and word
digests (hash values) equal the decrypted signatures, the
ranking score of N is correct and must be better than that
of the kth object, which informs the client about a poten-
tial completeness violation.
Algorithm 2. (MBR, SpatialDigest, WordWeightList,
WordDigestList) Authentication (VerificationObject,
String strrs, MkSKQuery q)
1: spatialstr null;
2: wordstrlist null;
3: MBR null;
4: WordWeightList null;
5: WordDigestList null;
6: for each word w in the query keywords do
7: w:str null;
8: wordstrlist:addðw:strÞ;
9: w:weight 1;
10: WordWeightList:addðw:weightÞ;
11: w:digest 0;
12: WordDigestList:addðw:digestÞ;
13: while strrs is not empty do
14: eV  strrs:nextEntryðÞ;
15: if eV refers to an object then
16: p VO:getEntryðeV Þ;
17: MBR MBR [ p:L;
18: spatialstr spatialstr j p:id j p:L;
19: for each word w0 in fðw;weight; hw0 ðÞÞg do
20: Find the corresponding w in wordstrlist and
WordWeightList;
21: w:str w:str j ðp:id; w0:weightÞ;
22: w:weight maxðw:weight; w0:weightÞ;
23: if eV refers to a non-leaf entry in the MIR-tree then
24: e VO:getEntryðeV Þ;
25: MBR MBR [ e:L;
26: spatialstr spatialstr j e:L j e:H;
27: for each word w0 in fðw;weight; hw0 ðÞÞg do
28: Find the corresponding w in wordstrlist and
WordWeightList;
29: w:str w:strjðw0:weight; hw0 ðÞ);
30: w:weight maxðw:weight; w0:weightÞ;
31: if eV is ½ then
32: (mbr; sd; wwl; wdl) Authentication (VO, strrs, q);
33: MBR MBR [mbr;
34: spatialstr spatialstr jmbr j sd;
35: for each word w0 in wwl and wdl do
36: Find the corresponding w in wordstrlist and
WordWeightList;
37: w:str w:str j ðw0:weight; hw0 ðÞÞ;
38: w:weight maxðw:weight; w0:weightÞ;
39: if eV is  then
40: for each word w inWordDigestList and wordstrlist do
41: w:digest hðw:strÞ;
42: Return ðMBR;hðspatialstrÞ;WordWeightList;
43: WordDigestListÞ;
3.3 Safe Zone Authentication
Recall that a safe zone is defined by influence objects. The
challenge of verifying the safe zone is to ensure that the
client notices that influence objects are missing if the SP
omits some influence objects. Considering the safe zone
in Fig. 6a, suppose that the SP only sends influence
objects p2 and p4 to the client, omitting p3. Then the client
will construct an incorrect (larger) safe zone, namely the
gray region in Fig. 6b. The influence objects p2 and p4 are
originally from the data set that can pass the verification
by checking root signatures. However, the client cannot
Fig. 5. Computation of spatial and word digests.
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determine whether the influence object set provided by
the SP is complete.
A naive approach is to send the whole data set to the
client so that the client is guaranteed to compute the cor-
rect safe zone. However, this involves the high communi-
cation cost of transferring the whole data set and is
impractical since the client may have neither enough stor-
age to store the data set nor computational resources to
efficiently compute the result. We aim to design a VO for
authenticating the safe zone such that the VO is as small
as possible.
3.3.1 VO Construction
We define a verification set VSsz that is intended to contain
the objects that are useful for verifying the safe zone, and
we insert the objects in this region into the VO. Verification
set VSsz is calculated based on theminimum andmaximum
border distances [40] defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. The minimum border distance of a non-result
object p from a result object p is the minimum distance
between p and the border of its dominant regionDomp;p, i.e.,
bordminðp; pÞ ¼ bordminðp; Domp;pÞ
¼ kp pk wðp
Þ
wðpÞ þ wðpÞ :
(7)
Definition 3.2. The maximum border distance of a non-result
object p from a result object p is the maximum distance
between p and the border of its dominant regionDomp;p, i.e.,
bordmaxðp; pÞ ¼ bordmaxðp; Domp;pÞ
¼ kp pk wðp
Þ
jwðpÞ  wðpÞj :
(8)
We first consider the safe zone of a top-1 object p. Let Iþ
be the set of influence objects of the safe zone of p, where
the weight of each influence object exceeds that of p. A
threshold t is defined as the minimum value of the maxi-
mum border distances of the influence objects in Iþ, i.e.,
t ¼ min
p2Iþ
bordmaxðp; pÞ: (9)
Verification set VSsz of the safe zone of p
 covers the objects
whose minimum border distances are smaller than t.
As an example, the gray region in Fig. 7 is the safe zone
of top-1 object p. The influence object set Iþ contains p1 and
p4. Threshold t ¼ bordmaxðp; Cp;p1Þ is shown as the dashed
circle. The verification set VSsz of the safe zone covers
objects p1 and p2 that are influence objects.
We proceed to define the verification set of the safe
zone of top-k result RS. The order-k MW-Voronoi cell of
set RS, denoted by kðRSÞ, contains all locations that
take set RS as the top-k result. In other words, kðRSÞ is
the safe zone for the result set RS. Region kðRSÞ can be
represented by the intersections of order-1 MW-Voronoi
cells [25]:
kðRSÞ ¼
\
p
j
2RS
DRSðpj Þ; (10)
where DRSðpj Þ denotes the MW-Voronoi cell of pj with
respect to the object set DRS. For each result object pj ,
threshold tj is computed as tj ¼ minp2Iþ
j
bordmaxðpj ; pÞ,
where Iþj is the influence object set of p

j . We next give the
formal definition of the verification set of the safe zone.
Definition 3.3. The verification set VSsz of a safe zone of top-k
result RS covers the objects that satisfy the following
condition:
^
p
j
2RS
bordminðpj ; pÞ  tj: (11)
Theorem 3.1. The objects covered by the verification set VSsz of
the safe zone of top-k result RS are sufficient to re-construct
the safe zone.
Proof. The theorem implies that the objects outside the veri-
fication region do not contribute the safe zone. According
to Definition 3.3, any object p outside the verification set
VSsz satisfies the following condition:
_
p
j
2RS
bordminðpj ; pÞ > tj: (12)
Suppose the minimum border distance of p exceeds the
threshold t of one result object p, i.e., bordminðp; pÞ > t.
Based on the definition of the minimum and maximum
border distances (Definitions 3.1 and 3.2) and t
(Equation (9)), the dominant region Domp;p completely
contains the safe zone of p, i.e.,Domp;p  ðpÞ. In other
words, object p does not contribute to the safe zone of p.
According to the definition of the safe zone of top-k
result RS (Equation (19)), object p does not contribute to
the safe zone of the top-k result. tu
Fig. 6. Example safe zones.
Fig. 7. Example safe zone and influence objects.
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Having the verification set, the VO for the safe zone can
be constructed by applying Algorithm 1 with the following
modification:
1) The input parameters are: MIRtreeNode N , top-k
resultRS, thresholds ftjg.
2) Replace strrs with the traversal string strsz for the
safe zone.
3) Replace the condition in line 7 with Equation (12),
where the minimum border distance of an entry e
in the MIR-tree is computed as bordminðp; eÞ ¼
kp ekminwðpÞ=ðwðpÞ þ wðeÞÞ.
The VO for the top-k result and the safe zone can be con-
structed using a single traversal of the MIR-tree. The tra-
versal strings strrs and strsz indicate the relevant objects
and entries for the top-k result and the safe zone, respec-
tively, while only one copy of each object and entry are
stored in the VO.
3.3.2 Verifying a Safe Zone
The client re-constructs the safe zone using the VO and
authenticates it. After obtaining the top-k objects, it calcu-
lates the safe zone using the top-k objects and the remaining
objects in the VO. Next, the client re-computes the root spa-
tial and word digests using the strsz and the VO by applying
Algorithm 2, and it verifies them against the decrypted root
spatial and word signatures, making sure that the entries in
the VO are from the original MIR-tree. Then, it verifies the
correctness of the safe zone by checking whether all the
other entries in the VO except the top-k objects and influence
objects satisfy Equation (12).
3.3.3 Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we prove that our proposal can authenticate
a safe zone.
Proof of soundness. Suppose that the safe zone constructed
by the client is fake or modified, i.e., the influence objects
derived from the VO are fake or modified. The re-con-
structed root hash values cannot be verified against the root
signatures provided by the data owner, which is detected,
since the hash function is one way collision-resistant and
the influence objects and their word weights must be used
by Algorithm 2.
Proof of completeness. Let p be one of the influence objects
and let N be the leaf node containing p. If all the entries in
N are in the VO, for sure p is in the VO and will be used to
construct the safe zone. If N is pruned by the server, the
MBR, keyword weights and digests of N are in the VO. The
client obtains the safe zone from the VO, without using p.
Since the re-constructed root hash values match the root sig-
natures, the dominant regions of the top-k result object over
N is correct and must intersect the safe zone, which informs
the client about a potential violations of completeness.
3.4 MIR*-Tree
The VO size is critical to minimize the client/server commu-
nication cost and reduce the client-side result verification
time. We proceed to propose an enhanced ADS, the MIR-
tree, that enables a reduction of the VO size. Specifically, the
digests in the MIR-tree are computed differently than in
the MIR-tree. The underlying idea is applicable to any tree
structure based ADS, e.g., the MR-tree [42], where each
node contains multiple entries.
In the MIR-tree, each non-leaf entry has one spatial digest
and several word digests. When a non-leaf entry (that is
pruned) is added to the VO, its MBR, one spatial digest, and
m word digests are included, where m is the number of
query keywords. Hence, for a visited non-leaf node in the
MIR-tree, nðmþ 1Þ digests may be added to the VO, where
n is the number of pruned entries. Let Sd be the size in bytes
of a digest and let Sm be the size in bytes of an MBR.
The contribution of a non-leaf node N to the VO is
SN ¼ n½ðmþ 1ÞSd þ Sm. With a node fanout in the range of
hundreds, n can be large. And the size of a digest Sd is large
(e.g., 64 bytes when using the SHA-512 hash function),
while the size of an MBR Sm is at most 32 bytes if using dou-
ble precision. Hence, the VO size is dominated by the num-
ber of digests included.
We propose a new way to compute the digests by incor-
porating the Rabin cryptosystem (quadratic residue) [31] to
reduce the digests being added to the VO, resulting in a
new index structure, the MIR-tree, where for each visited
non-leaf node, at most mþ 1 digests are added to the VO.
Then the contribution of a non-leaf node N in the MIR-tree
to the VO is SN ¼ ðmþ 1ÞSd þ n  Sm. Given an n value
larger than 100, the VO size of the MIR-tree can be signifi-
cantly reduced, compared with that of the MIR-tree.
Finding a solution to x2 	 y ðmod NÞ, where N ¼ pq and
p; q are primes, is equivalent to factoring a large number
[31]. Thus, finding x under passive attacks is as hard as fac-
toring. We proceed to exemplify how to compute the digests
in the MIR-tree using the quadratic residue. If an entry
points to a leaf node, its digests are the same as those in the
MIR-tree. If an entry points to a non-leaf node, its spatial
digest is computed from the hash value of the concatenation
of the binary representation of all the MBRs in its child node
and one digest that is the modulo multiplication of all the
digests’ squares in its child node. As shown in Fig. 8, the
child node of R5 contains four entries. The spatial digest of
R5 is computed as R5:H ¼ hðR1:LjR2:LjR3:LjR4:LjHsÞ,
whereHs ¼
Q4
i¼1Ri:H
2 ðmod NÞ. The word digests are com-
puted in a similar way. Suppose all the five entries in Fig. 8
contain word ‘c’ with weight 1. The word digest of R5 for
word ‘c’ is hcðR5Þ ¼ hððR1; 1ÞjðR2; 1ÞjðR3; 1Þj ðR4; 1ÞjHwÞ,
whereHw ¼
Q4
i¼1 hcðRiÞ2 ðmod NÞ.
During the process of constructing a VO, when visit-
ing a non-leaf node, the modulo multiplication of the
spatial digests of pruned entries and the modulo multi-
plication of the word digests of pruned entries for each
query keyword are added to the VO. Consider the exam-
ple in Fig. 8, where all the five entries contain word ‘c’.
If entries R1; R2, and R4 are pruned, we add one spatial
Fig. 8. Spatial digests in the MIR*-Tree.
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digest H 0s ¼
QfR1:H;R2:H; R4:Hg ðmod NÞ and one word
digest H 0w ¼
QfhcðR1Þ; hcðR2Þ; hcðR4Þg ðmod NÞ to the VO.
In contrast, in the MIR-tree, three spatial digests,
R1:H;R2:H, and R4:H, and three word digests,
hcðR1Þ; hcðR2Þ, and hcðR4Þ, are added to the VO.
The client is able to compute the spatial digest and the
word digests for a node in a similar way as does the server
using the VO. Continuing with the above example, the client
first re-computes the spatial digest and the word digest of
R4, i.e., R4:H and hcðR4Þ. Then Hs ¼ ðH 0s  R4:HÞ2 ðmod NÞ
and Hw ¼ ðH 0w  hcðR4ÞÞ2 ðmod NÞ. The correctness is
guaranteed by
Q
h2i ðmod NÞ ¼ ð
Q
hiÞ2 ðmod NÞ.
To observe the potential improvement, Fig. 9a plots SN
and SN as a function of n, where Sm ¼ 32, Sd ¼ 64, and
m ¼ 1. As n increases, i.e., more entries in a non-leaf node
are pruned, the difference between SN and SN becomes
larger. The size of the contribution of a non-leaf node in the
MIR-tree to the VO (SN ) increases more slowly than that in
the MIR-tree (SN ). Fig. 9b illustrates that SN and SN exhibit
similar trends as the number of query keywords m
increases. We expect that the MIR-tree produces a smaller
VO than does the MIR-tree, and the empirical study con-
firms our expectation.
4 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We conduct empirical studies to evaluate our proposals,
comparing with two baselines introduced in Section 4.1.
Section 4.2 presents the data sets, queries, parameters, and
platform used in experiments. The proposals for the authen-
tication of MkSK queries are evaluated in Section 4.3.
4.1 Baselines
We develop two baseline algorithms that exploit existing
techniques for the authentication of MkSK queries. One is
Inverted Index and Sorted Lists (IISL) utilizing signature
chaining [26], and the other is Inverted Index and MR-tree
(IIMR) that combines existing proposals [27], [42].
Inverted index and sorted lists. The IISL consists of two
parts. One part is the inverted index [46], which is an effi-
cient and popular index for keyword search, indexing the
text descriptions of objects. The other part contains two
sorted lists, indexing the spatial point locations of the
objects. One list is for x-coordinates and the other one is for
y-coordinates. Both lists are sorted ascendingly. We apply
the idea of signature chaining to authenticate MkSK queries.
A signature chain is constructed for each of the two sorted
lists and each posting list in the inverted index.
Given an MkSK query q, we first compute its top-k result
RS and the safe zone kðRSÞ. In order to utilize the
signature chaining to authenticate q, verification sets VSX
and VSY for the two sorted lists of coordinates and VSwi for
the posting list of each query keyword in the inverted index
are constructed to compute a VO. We show how to compose
the above verification sets in the appendix, available online.
A VO is constructed by retrieving the objects covered by
the verification sets. Each entry in the VO takes the form
ðid;L; fðw;weightÞgÞ, where id is the identifier, L is the min-
imum bounding rectangle, and ðw;weightÞ is a pair of a
query keyword and its weight. In addition, a condensed
RSA signature is computed by multiplying all the signa-
tures of the objects in the VO. The client recomputes the top-
k result and the safe zone from the VO and verifies the con-
densed RSA signature.
Inverted index and MR-tree. The IIMR consists of an
inverted index that indexes the text descriptions of the
objects and an MR-tree that indexes the spatial point loca-
tions of the objects. Verification sets VST and VSs, presented
in the appendix, available online, are used to construct a VO
to authenticate an MkSK query result. Specifically, the effi-
cient approach TNRA-Chain-MHT proposed by Pang and
Mouratidis [27] is applied to the inverted index to authenti-
cate the text relevancies of objects using VST , and the MR-
tree authenticates the spatial distances of objects using VSS .
4.2 Experiment Setup
We use two data sets, each containing objects with a point
location and a text description, for studying the robustness
and performance of the proposals. Data set EURO contains
points of interest (e.g., ATMs, hotels, stores) in Europe.1
Data set LONDFLI contains objects referring to photos
taken in the area of London, where each object is composed
by a spatial location and a text describing the photo (title
and description). Table 3 offers additional details. We nor-
malize object locations to fit a square domain with side
length 10,000 meters.
The Brinkhoff generator [5] is used to generate a trajec-
tory using one location acquisition per timestamp (second).
Each experiment has 100 moving queries with such trajecto-
ries. The keyword set of each query is generated by ran-
domly picking an object in the data set and randomly
choosing adjacent words from the document of the object.
We generally report the average value per query per time-
stamp of the following: (i) server-side elapsed time (for the
query processing and the VO construction), (ii) server-side
simulated I/O cost, (iii) client-side elapsed time (for the
result verification), and (iv) communication cost (the VO
size in KBytes).
We study the two baselines and our proposed solu-
tions—the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree. By default, we set
Fig. 9. SN vs. SN , Sm ¼ 32, Sd ¼ 64.
TABLE 3
Data Set Statistics
data set # of objects # of distinct
words
average # of words
per object
EURO 162,033 35,315 18
LONDFLI 1,255,149 222,613 8
1. http://www.pocketgpsworld.com
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the number k of results to 1, the number of query key-
words to 2, the client moving speed to 10 m/s, and the
fanout of the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree to 200. We used
disk-based index structures with a page size fixed at 4
KBytes. A simulated LRU buffer with size 256 MB is
used. All the algorithms are implemented in Java and run
on a Linux machine with one processor (Intel(R) Core
(TM)2 Quad CPU Q8400 @ 2.66 GHz) and 4 GB memory.
The Java Virtual Machine Heap is set to 2 GB. We employ
the SHA-512 as the hash function and 1024-bit RSA as the
signature scheme.
4.3 Performance Results
We study the proposed methods under varying settings,
including the performance on different data sets, varying
numbers of requested results k, varying numbers of query
keywords, varying speeds ofmoving queries, varying fanouts
of theMIR-tree and theMIR-tree, and varying data set sizes.
Evaluation on different data sets. Table 4 reports the aver-
age server elapsed time, server I/O cost, client elapsed
time, number of entries in the VO, VO size, index size,
and communication frequency for the four methods on
the two data sets. As expected, the server elapsed time is
proportional to the server I/O cost. And the client
elapsed time is correlated with the VO size. The MIR var-
iants, including the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree, outper-
form baseline IISL by orders of magnitude in all aspects.
The reason why IISL has extremely poor performance is
that its text and spatial score intervals are derived sepa-
rately. Furthermore, its spatial score interval is converted
into coordinate intervals on the x and y axes. Those inter-
vals cover too many objects that are added to the VO.
Hence, its processing costs at both the server and client
are high, and the VO size is large.
The server elapsed time and I/O cost of baseline IIMR
are comparable to those the MIR variants, while the MIR
variants outperform the IIMR by orders of magnitude in
terms of the client elapsed time, number of entries in the
VO, and the VO size. Although the IIMR also derives the
text score interval and the spatial score interval separately,
its processing cost is reduced due to the use of the MR-tree.
However, the separate intervals still cover too many objects
that are added to the VO, resulting in high verification cost
at the client and large VO size.
The performance of the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree are
comparable in terms of server elapsed time and I/O cost.
The numbers of entries in the VO for the MIR-tree and the
MIR-tree are the same. This is because the two indexes
have similar structures and processing algorithms. The
MIR-tree differs from the MIR-tree in how digests are com-
puted. In the MIR-tree, fewer digests are added to the VO
so that its client elapsed time and the VO size are signifi-
cantly smaller than that for the MIR-tree.
In terms of index size, the IIMR is the smallest. The MIR-
tree and the MIR-tree occupy more space than does the
IIMR due to the inverted files attached to non-leaf nodes.
The IISL occupies substantial space due to the signature
chains on the sorted lists of the x and y coordinates. These
indexes, except for the IIMR, cannot fit in main memory.
Our proposals outperform the two baseline algorithms
consistently on the two data sets. We use LONDFLI as the
default data set for the remaining experiments. Baseline IISL
is omitted due to its poor performance and high storage cost.
Varying k. Fig. 10 shows the performance of the three
approaches when varying the number k of requested results
on data set LONDFLI. The MIR variants substantially and
consistently outperform the baseline in terms of client
elapsed time and VO size. As expected, the server elapsed
time, client elapsed time, and VO size of the three methods
TABLE 4
Performance per Timestamp on Data Sets
Data Set EURO LONDFLI
IISL 215.73 48966.67
Server elapsed time IIMR 20.03 169.69
(milliseconds) MIR 20.88 210.53
MIR 14.09 191.03
IISL 5611.06 2569.29
Server I/O cost IIMR 1.80 6.30
(page accesses) MIR 1.63 5.17
MIR 1.63 5.17
IISL 33.64 584.89
Client elapsed time IIMR 211.44 2104.79
(milliseconds) MIR 14.26 105.52
MIR 12.31 97.26
IISL 4195.86 30127.04
# of entries IIMR 2965.34 8500.97
in the VO MIR 293.08 756.31
MIR 293.08 756.31
IISL 173.13 1266.15
IIMR 138.10 410.17
VO size (KB) MIR 15.89 45.53
MIR 13.90 36.67
IISL 2.97 635.05
Index size IIMR 0.24 1.68
(GB) MIR 3.13 23.67
MIR 3.13 23.67
Communication
frequency All 0.034 0.032
Fig. 10. Performance per timestamp, varying k.
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increase as k increases, since requesting more result objects
increases the computation cost at the server side and calls
for a larger VO, resulting in higher verification cost at the
client side. The server I/O costs of the three methods
decrease slightly as k increases. This is mainly because
more result objects produce a smaller safe zone, which ena-
bles more pruning. Hence, fewer index nodes (pages) are
loaded from disk. However, the processing cost of each vis-
ited index node increases due to the larger result set.
Varying the number of query keywords. Fig. 11 shows the
server elapsed time, server I/O cost, client elapsed time,
and VO size of the three methods when varying the number
of query keywords on data set LONDFLI. The MIR variants
again consistently beat the baseline algorithm. As the num-
ber of query keywords increases, the performance of the
three approaches decreases, since more objects are involved
in the computations.
Varying the speed of moving queries. Fig. 12 shows the per-
formance of the three approaches when varying the speed
of the moving queries on data set LONDFLI. We observe
that as the speed increases, the computation and communi-
cation costs increase slightly, since a query with high speed
more quickly leaves the safe zone and requests a query re-
evaluation from the server. The MIR variants outperform
the baseline significantly at different speeds.
Varying the fanout. The ability of the MIR-tree to reduce
the VO size depends on the number of pruned entries in vis-
ited non-leaf nodes (Section 3.4). However, it is difficult to
control the number of pruned entries, which may depend
on several factors, e.g., the fanout, the query, and the distri-
bution of the objects in the data set. This experiment studies
how the performance of the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree are
affected by the fanout. Fig. 13 shows the performance when
varying the fanout on data set LONDFLI. The server
elapsed time and the server I/O cost of the MIR-tree and
the MIR-tree are comparable, while the MIR-tree has
lower client elapsed time and smaller VO size than the MIR-
tree. The reason is that in the MIR-tree, fewer digests are
added to the VO, thus reducing the processing cost at the
client and the VO size. And the operation of deriving one
digest from multiple digests does not add much computa-
tional cost in the MIR-tree. As the fanout increases, the
server elapsed time and I/O cost decrease, since the heights
of the MIR-tree and the MIR-tree decrease so that it is faster
to reach the leaf level to obtain results. In contrast, the client
elapsed time and VO size increase as the fanout increases.
Since a node contains more entries, more entries may be
added to the VO, it results in higher processing cost at the
client side. The VO size of the MIR-tree is 20 percent
smaller than that of the MIR-tree when the fanout is 200.
The improvement of the MIR-tree decreases as the fanout
increases. That is mainly because the number of pruned
entries decreases.
Scalability. To observed the scalability of the proposed
indexes, we generated five data sets from LONDFLI by ran-
domly selecting 200 K, 400 K, 600 K, 800 K, and 1 M objects.
Fig. 14 shows that the server elapsed time, server I/O cost,
Fig. 11. Performance per Timestamp, Varying the Number of Keywords.
Fig. 12. Performance per timestamp, varying the speed of moving
queries.
Fig. 13. Performance per timestamp, varying fanout.
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client elapsed time, and VO size exhibit increasing trends as
with the data set size. Table 5 shows that the index size
increases linearly as the data set size increases. All the
indexes cannot fit the main memory.
5 RELATED WORK
5.1 Static Query Authentication
In general, existing query authentication techniques are
classified into MHT-based approaches and approaches
using signature chaining.
MHT-based approaches.Apopular authentication approach
based on the MHT [23] has been used widely in many pro-
posals [19], [27], [42], [43]. It is a hierarchical structure in
which digests of nodes are recursively computed using a
secure hash function from the leaf level to the root level.
Then, the DO signs the root digest using a private key, e.g.,
RSA [33].
Devanbu et al. [9] authenticate one-dimensional range
queries using an MHT on the query attribute. To prove the
completeness of the result for a range query ½a; b over a
sorted list ðr1; r2; . . . ; rnÞ, the SP discloses the boundary
records to the client. In other words, the query result is
expanded into ðri1; ri; . . . ; rj; rjþ1Þ, where ri1 < a  ri,
rj  b < rjþ1, and 1 < i  j < n. The boundary records
guarantee that no records in the query range are omitted. In
addition to the expanded result, for each node visited in the
MHT, digests of all left-siblings of the left boundary record
ri1 and digests of all right-siblings of the right boundary
record rjþ1 on the paths from the root are added to the VO.
If the re-constructed root digest from the VO matches the
decrypted root signature, the result is sound. Later, two
disk-based adaptations of the MHT, i.e., the VB-tree [28]
and the Merkle B-tree (MB-tree) [19], has been are proposed.
Pang and Mouratidis [27] apply the MHT to the
inverted index and documents to authenticate text
retrieval query results (keyword search). The proposed
Term-MHT builds an MHT on the posting list of each
word, while the Term-CMHT constructs an MHT on the
posting list entries in each disk page, since a posting list
normally occupies several disk pages. The digest of the
MHT (hash value of the root) for a disk page is integrated
into the MHT for the previous disk page. The digest of
the first page of each posting list is signed by the DO,
which is used to verify any j leading pages of a posting
list. A document is represented by a sequence of entries
ðw; weightÞ in ascending w order. The proposed Docu-
ment-MHT takes the document entries as leaves. Both the
Term-MHT and Term-CMHT are used to guarantee the
that posting lists involved in the query processing are cor-
rect, and the Document-MHT is used to check the com-
puted score of each encountered document.
Another solution inspired by the MHT technique is the
MR-tree [42], an index based on the R-tree that is capable
of authenticating arbitrary spatial queries. Its leaf nodes are
identical to those of the R-tree. Non-leaf nodes contain
entries of the form e ¼ ðptr;L; HÞ, where e:ptr is a reference
to a child node, e:L is the MBR of all rectangles in entries of
the child node, and e:H is a digest of the child node. The
digest of a leaf node is computed from the hash value of the
concatenation of the binary representation of all objects in
the node. The digest of a non-leaf node summarizes its child
nodes’ MBRs as well as their digests. The digest of the root
node is signed by the DO and is stored with the tree.
For the client to verify a query result, the SP utilizes the
MR-tree to generate a verification object. A circular verifica-
tion set
ðq; gÞwith center q and radius equal to the distance
between q and its kth nearest neighbor is defined. The MR-
tree is traversed in depth-first manner with the following
conditions: (1) a non-leaf entry e is added to the VO if e does
not intersect 
ðq; gÞ; (2) all objects in a visited leaf node are
added to the VO. To authenticate the query result, the client
first reconstructs the digest of the root of the MR-tree from
VO. Then it verifies it against the root signature offered by
the data owner. Then the client finds the kNNs directly
from the VO, defines its own verification set 
ðq; g 0Þ, and
checks whether no non-leaf entries in VO intersects 
ðq; g 0Þ.
If yes, the correctness of the NN result is guaranteed.
Lin et al. [22] study the authentication of location-
based skyline queries. They propose two authentication
methods. One is based on the MR-tree. The other one
utilizes the MR-Sky-tree that is designed specially for
skyline queries.
Signature chaining. Unlike MHT, signature chaining [26]
authenticates both the soundness and completeness of one-
dimensional range queries. Consider a data set containing 4
records p1-p4, sorted on the query attribute. The data owner
inserts two special records p0 and p5 with values 1 and
þ1. A signature is created for each record, except the special
records. The signature of a record pi is based on the hash value
of the concatenation of its preceding record pi1, itself pi, and
its succeeding record piþ1. The data set and the signatures are
Fig. 14. Performance per timestamp, varying data set size.
TABLE 5
Index Size (GB)
200 K 400 K 600 K 800 K 1 M
MIR 4.03 7.91 12.13 15.76 19.71
MIR 4.03 7.91 12.13 15.76 19.71
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sent to the SP. Assume that the result of a range query con-
tains p2; p3, and p4. The SP returns a VO containing the result
ðp2; p3; p4Þ, the signature of each record in the result
ðsig123; sig234; sig345Þ, and the boundary records p1 and p5. In
order to reduce the VO size, the Condensed-RSA [24] adds
only one signature sig ¼ sig123  sig234  sig345 ðmod nÞ to the
VO instead of three. Given a VO, the client first checks that the
signature is valid, which guarantees that all the records in the
VO are correct and adjacent. Then the client checks that the
two boundary records fall outside the query range, which
ensures that no result record is missing at the range bound-
aries, i.e., p2 and p4 are indeed the first and last records of the
result.
This scheme has also been extended to multi-dimen-
sional index structures [7]. Compared with the MHT-based
approaches, signature chaining methods incur high index
construction costs, storage overhead, and client-side verifi-
cation time [19].
The two baseline algorithms considered in the experi-
mental study exploit the above authentication techniques
(MHT, MR-tree, and signature chaining), and they are
found to be inefficient compared to our proposals.
5.2 Moving Query Authentication
Existing technique for authenticating moving kNN queries
[44] cannot help in authenticating MkSK queries, since the
safe zone of a kNN query is a Voronoi cell [25], while the
safe zone of an MkSK query is a Multiplicatively Weighted
Voronoi cell [25]. A Voronoi cell considers only spatial dis-
tance and has a polygon shape. In contrast, an MW-Voronoi
cell defines the influence region of an object based on its
weight (e.g., text relevance) and is an irregular shape con-
sisting of edges, arcs and holes. The structures and con-
struction algorithms for these different kinds of cells are
totally different. Fig. 15b illustrates the MW-Voronoi dia-
gram of the same nine objects as in Fig. 15a. In the MW-Vor-
onoi diagram, each object has a weight (underlined
numbers). These weights are the text relevancies between
the objects and the query, known only when the query is
submitted. In other words, different queries produce differ-
ent MW-Voronoi diagrams on the same data set. Thus, pre-
computation based approaches [17], [44] are inapplicable,
since enumerating all possible MW-Voronoi diagrams is
computationally prohibitive.
Yung et al. [45] study the authentication of moving range
queries. The safe zone of a moving range query and its veri-
fication set are also different from ours, and thus their tech-
nique is inapplicable to our problem.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new authenticated data structure, the
MIR-tree, to efficiently authenticate moving top-k spatial
keyword query results, thus guaranteeing the soundness
and completeness of both a top-k result and its corre-
sponding safe zone. A verification object for authenticat-
ing the top-k results and safe zones of MkSK queries is
designed. Algorithms for constructing and using verifica-
tion objects for verifying the top-k results and safe zones
are developed. An enhancement of the MIR-tree, the
MIR-tree, is proposed to further reduce the communica-
tion cost. Extensive empirical studies on real data sets
demonstrate that the proposed approaches are capable of
outperforming two baseline algorithms that utilize exist-
ing techniques by orders of magnitude.
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